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Abstract 
 
In order to reduce the influence of corruption on electricity sector performance, most 
Sub-Saharan African countries have implemented electricity sector reforms. However, 
after nearly two and half decades of reforms, there is no evidence whether the reforms 
have mitigated corruption. Neither is there evidence of performance improvement of 
the reforms in terms of technical, economic or welfare impact. This paper aims to fill 
this gap. We use a dynamic panel estimator with a novel panel data of 47 Sub-Saharan 
African countries from 2002 to 2013. We analyse the impact of corruption and two key 
aspects of electricity reforms – creations of independent regulatory agencies and private 
sector participation – on three key performance indicators: technical efficiency, access 
to electricity and income. We find that corruption can significantly reduce technical 
efficiency of the sector and constrain the efforts to increase access to electricity and 
national income. The adverse effects are reduced where independent regulatory 
agencies are established and privatisation is implemented. These findings suggest that 
well-designed reforms not only boost the performance of the sector directly, but also 
indirectly reduce the negative effects of macro level institutional deficiencies such as 
corruption on micro and macro performance indicators. 
 
Keywords: electricity sector reform; corruption; Sub-Saharan Africa; panel data; 
dynamic GMM. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, a body of literature has emerged that establishes the various 
transmission channels through which corruption can constrain economic development. For 
example, corruption, defined as the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain”,1 is found to 
have corrosive effects on economic development through increasing transaction costs and 
uncertainty (Murphy et al., 1991), inefficient investments (Mauro, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993), reduced human capital development (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005), and misallocation 
of resources (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
Recently, attention has shifted to another important but less explored micro-level channel, i.e., 
the operation and regulation of electricity sectors particularly in developing countries (Wren-
Lewis, 2015; Estache et al., 2009; Dal Bó, 2006; Bergara et al., 1998). The preponderance of 
evidence from this strand of literature suggests that corruption can cripple economic 
development by inhibiting the performance of the electricity sector. For instance, corruption 
reduces labour productivity (Wren-Lewis, 2015; Dal Bó, 2006), increases transmission and 
distribution losses and constrains the efforts to increase access to electricity services (see 
Estache et al., 2009). 
The impact of corruption on electricity sector performance is particularly relevant in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), where welfare improvements can be linked to widespread corruption 
(Gyimah-Brempong and de Camacho, 2006). Despite the difficulty of measuring corruption, 
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) produced by Transparency International (TI, 2013) 
shows that eight of the twenty most corrupt countries in the world are in SSA and the only 
region with more than two countries in this group. Thus, in weak institutional settings, major 
                                                          
1 See Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) for discussions on this definition. 
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undertakings such as the construction of large hydroelectric dams, government intervention, 
monopolistic characteristics of the sector, absence of competition and substantial revenues 
from the sales of electricity make the sector vulnerable to corruption (Bosshard, 2005; World 
Bank, 2009; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). 
The above factors could be partly blamed for turning the electricity sectors in SSA countries 
into sources of corruption and cronyism (Patterson, 1999) and the concentration of electricity 
services to urban areas whilst rural areas remained unconnected or underserved (Byrne and 
Mun, 2003). This is referred to as ‘electricity poverty’ and is widespread in the region.2 In order 
to improve efficiency and reduce corruption, many SSA countries have implemented 
Electricity Sector Reforms (ESRs) (Eberhard et al., 2016). Such reforms, also referred to as the 
‘standard electricity reform model’ and often prescribed to developing countries by multilateral 
development organisations, were first implemented in OECD countries such as Chile, Norway 
and the UK in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The experiences of these pioneer countries supported the notion that effective implementation 
of ESRs would not only enhance technical efficiency of the sector but would also translate the 
efficiency gains into social welfare and economic growth (Sen et al., 2016). Moreover, 
according to the World Bank (2000), as part of wider economic liberalisation, deregulation and 
demonopolisation policies, ESR policies were further underpinned by anticorruption agendas. 
Thus, reforms not only promised improved efficiency and access to reliable and affordable 
services, they also promised reduction in corruption in the sector (Estache et al., 2009) and the 
wider economy (World Bank, 2000). 
                                                          
2 The majority of the estimated 500 million people who lack access to clean and affordable electricity in the region 
are poor and rely on traditional biomass – wood, agricultural residues and dung – for cooking and heating needs 
(IEA, 2014). 
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Despite the anticipated positive outcomes from implementation of the reforms, there are 
widespread perceptions that reforms have hurt the poor through increased tariffs, stronger 
enforcement of bills collection (Scott and Seth, 2013) and unemployment, while benefitting 
the powerful and wealthy notably through corruption (Auriol and Blanc, 2009). As a result, the 
reforms often lacked social legitimacy, and this usually manifests through increases in 
electricity theft and vandalism (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). Moreover, as Estache et al. 
(2009) have noted, large numbers of people believe that corruption still remains a problem in 
the sector. However, despite the anecdotes that connect corruption to sector performance after 
the reform efforts, there is a lack of empirical evidence on whether the electricity sector reforms 
in SSA region have mitigated or exacerbated the effect of corruption in the electricity sector. 
Previous empirical studies have shown the relevance of corruption as a driver of ESR in 
developing countries, but they either focus on labour efficiency in electricity distribution 
utilities (e.g., Wren-Lewis, 2015; Dal Bó and Rossi, 2007) or on different sectors (e.g., Estache 
et al., 2009). Moreover, the former two studies focused on Latin American countries while the 
latter study includes countries from different developing regions. Therefore, to our knowledge, 
this is the first empirical study to assess the electricity reforms in SSA countries and among the 
few studies that examine the interactions between country level institutions and micro-level 
electricity reform steps (e.g., Wren-Lewis, 2015; Estache et al., 2009). Most studies of this 
strand of literature tend to focus on specific aspects of the textbook reform model or on specific 
countries without explicitly accounting for the role of institutions apart from those earlier 
mentioned. 
Our paper addresses the gap in the literature and contributes to better understanding of the 
institutional aspect of electricity sector reforms (e.g., Dorman, 2014; Chang and Berdiev, 2011; 
Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a; Cubbin and Stern, 2006; Erdogdu, 2013) and the political economy 
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literature of regulatory agencies (e.g., Pitlik, 2007; Potrafle, 2010; Scott and Seth, 2013). This 
study indirectly contributes to the literature on obsolescing bargaining (Vernon, 1971) since 
political corruption entails government commitment to honour the terms of electricity reforms 
and particularly the privatisation of state assets, could be doubtful. Thus, the findings provide 
further insights into why investments in the SSA electricity markets tend to be more 
concentrated in the generation segment than in the distribution utilities since the former is more 
susceptible to corruption. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the nearly three decades of ESR 
in SSA countries and discusses how each of the key steps of the reform model may mitigate 
the adverse effects of corruption on the performance of the electricity reforms. Section 3 
presents three research hypotheses related to key performance aspects of reforms to be tested. 
Section 4 presents the empirical methodology and the data used in the study. Section 5 presents 
and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Electricity Sector Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Historically, the generation, supply and marketing of electricity in most SSA countries, as in 
many other regions of the world, were dominated by vertically integrated state-owned utilities 
(Clark et al., 2005). These arrangements were partly regarded as primary functions of the state, 
such as, the high fixed costs of large plants, the desire of governments to enhance welfare, 
national security concerns, social equity objectives (World Bank, 1993) and ideological reasons 
(Erdogdu, 2013). The state-ownership was reinforced by the idea that permitting more than one 
firm would increase costs while this resulted in higher investments by public utilities relative 
to private utilities (USAID, 2005). The 1980s and 1990s saw SSA countries unable to sustain 
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investments in the sector. Decades of government investments had not produced the anticipated 
results as services and subsidies remained concentrated in urban areas, nor were there 
improvements in quality and reliability of service. 
The first electricity reform took place in Chile in 1983, and then in OECD countries such as 
Norway and United Kingdom. From these experiences emerged the theory and practice of the 
‘standard textbook reform model’. It was believed that reforms would reduce the dominance 
of the state through creation of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) and private sector 
participation (Jamasb et al., 2016). The expected outcomes were the enhancement of economic 
and technical efficiency of utilities and the transfer of efficiency gains to consumers in the form 
of improved access to affordable and reliable electricity (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012b; Estache et 
al., 2009). 
In SSA, macroeconomic conditions such as the deteriorating international business climate, 
fiscal constraints faced by governments, structural adjustment programmes (Jamasb, 2006) 
compelled the countries to undertake structural and institutional reforms of their sectors. Many 
of the arguments that supported state ownership of utilities disappeared by the 1980s as the 
economies of scale of vertically integrated utilities had been exhausted (Joskow, 2006; Gilbert 
et al., 1996), therefore state-ownership came to be seen as a hindrance to adoption of new 
technologies by the private sector (Downing et al., 2006). The reforms in SSA were triggered 
by investment shortfalls and concerns that monopolisation of the sector by state-owned utilities 
were wasteful and inefficient (Victor, 2005). 
The standard reform model calls for the unbundling of state-owned electricity utilities 
vertically (generation, transmission, distribution and retailing) and horizontally (generation and 
retailing). The unbundled parts amenable to competition would then be sold to the private 
sector and an independent sector regulator would supervise and regulate the natural monopoly 
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parts of the sector (Victor and Heller, 2007). The electricity sector specific and external factors 
that triggered ESR varied in developed and developing countries (Jamasb et al., 2016). In 
addition, the extent and outcome of reforms have differed in these countries (Nepal, 2013). The 
reforms in developed countries were undertaken in the context of excess capacity and stable 
institutions aimed at improving economic and financial performance of technically reliable 
systems, encourage interregional trade, transfer investment risks to the private sector, offer 
consumer choice, and reduce overinvestment (Jamasb et al., 2014; Erdogdu, 2013). 
Conversely, ESR in the developing countries were implemented within a context of poor 
technical and financial performances of state-owned utilities, weak institutional setting, 
inability of utilities and governments to mobilise sufficient investments to provide access, low 
tariffs and poor service quality (Jamasb et al., 2005). 
However, the suitability of the standard reform model for developing countries has been 
questioned as it has usually resulted in higher prices, loss of employment, unreliable service, 
and concentration of service to profitable areas since private firms did not have incentives to 
extend the service to poor people (Transnational Institute, 2002; Victor, 2005). Thus, in the 
unprofitable segments there has been an absence of service provision (Auriol and Picard, 2006). 
The poor access rates in SSA relative to other developing regions may be partly attributed to 
this lack of incentives. For example, although between 2000 and 2014, there was some progress 
in increasing access to electricity in all developing regions of the world; access deficit is 
overwhelmingly concentrated in SSA region, as progress has fallen consistently short of 
population growth. The poor outcomes have led the reform critics to argue that the state should 
take the responsibility for such investments (Victor, 2005). 
Moreover, the experiences of ESR around the world have shown the difficulty of creating 
efficient electricity sectors underpinned by genuine competitive markets that show significant 
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potentials to benefit consumers through reliable service, low tariffs, and choice of alternative 
sources (IEA, 2014). As a result, the reform experience in SSA has lagged behind the 
anticipated outcomes of the standard reform model and has led to extensive political backlash 
against the reforms. Higher electricity prices have been an obvious source of political resistance 
in many countries, especially for groups that have become accustomed to paying near nothing 
for electricity services (Victor, 2005) and this resistance was further reinforced by the 
awareness that elections can be won or lost because of electricity prices (UNDP and World 
Bank, 2005). 
However, the difficulties of ESR in developing economies have not deterred SSA countries 
from implementing some aspects of the textbook reform model. Twenty-four of the countries 
in the region have enacted ESR law, three-quarter have attracted private participation, nearly 
all have corporatized their utilities, two-thirds have set-up regulatory bodies, and more than a 
third have Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in place (Eberhard et al., 2016). Table 1 
summarises the reform efforts in the SSA countries studied here. 
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No ESR  
Initiated 
Vertically 
integrated w. 
priv.* 
Vertically 
integrated w. 
IRA only 
Vertically  
integrated w.  
IRA and priv. 
Unbundled 
w. IRA  
and priv. 
Unbundled 
w. IRA 
only 
Benin 
Burundi 
Central 
African Rep. 
Djibouti 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Eritrea 
Seychelles 
Congo Dem. 
Rep. 
Guinea 
Botswana 
Chad 
Madagascar 
Mauritius  
Liberia 
Guinea Bissau 
Comoros  
Congo, Rep. 
Mauritania Angola 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Cameroon 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Ethiopia 
Gabon  
Gambia 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Lesotho 
Rwanda 
São Tomé & 
Príncipe 
Senegal 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Zambia 
Ghana 
Kenya** 
Nigeria 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe** 
Sudan 
Niger 
Swaziland   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* All forms of private participation excluding management contracts, lease contracts and concession. 
** Kenya and Zimbabwe have only undertaken partial unbundling. 
*** Somalia and South Sudan are not included in our analysis. The former due to the lack of data. The 
latter country gained independence from (North) Sudan in 2011 and our data covers until 2013. 
Table 1. Implementations of Electricity Sector Reforms in SSA countries 
Sources: Eberhard et al. (2016) and World Bank Infrastructure Database (2017) 
 
3. Literature on Corruption and Sector Reform 
Corruption and Corporatization/Commercialization 
Although independent and incorporated under the same laws governing private corporations, 
the state retains ownership of corporatized utilities and in some cases runs them through 
appointed independent board of directors. Whether managed by an appointed board of directors 
or private contractors, corporatizations of utilities were mainly aimed at reducing the 
inefficiencies induced by government interference in their operations, facilitate the entry of 
private capital and move utilities toward cost-recovery in pricing through improved metering, 
billing and collection (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). 
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Corporatized utilities have achieved modest performance improvements especially those 
operated by management contractors. 3  Positive outcomes such as improvements in bill 
collections and reductions in system losses in almost all SSA with management contractors, 
made international aid agencies involved in most management contracts, to regard them as a 
first step towards comprehensive reforms. However, contracting out to private sector has been 
difficult and contentious in some countries. For example, most governments were unwilling to 
honour their financial obligations needed to expand capacities, reject tariff hikes (e.g., in 
Senegal), unwilling to compel government agencies to pay their bills, forbidding utilities from 
reducing the workforce or disconnecting delinquent consumers (Nellis, 2005). Stakeholders 
removed from management positions or employees laid off criticised such contracts especially 
where large fees were paid to management contractors (Eberhard and Gratwick, 2011). The 
large payouts were argued not to be commensurate with the modest improvements in the 
finances of utilities. This helped galvanise a political backlash against such contracts in the 
region. Moreover, many regulators failed to capture the efficiency gains and competition from 
management contractors (Nellis, 2005). As a result, management contracts were viewed as 
unsustainable. Of 16 such contracts in SSA, 4 were cancelled before their expiration dates, 12 
were allowed to expire after their initial terms, and only in Liberia and Lesotho there are active 
contracts. Eberhard and Gratwick (2011). Meanwhile, Gabon and Mali have adopted further 
reforms. 
The eventual disengagement of management contractors from many SSA countries shows that 
state-owned utilities still dominate the sector. Some governments force utilities to charge 
electricity prices below the costs of generation and supply, dictate the choice of plants locations 
or mandate utilities to purchase their energy from state-owned companies (Nellis, 2005) even 
                                                          
3 See Appendix A for types, project names and status of management contracts in the countries of our sample. 
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while lower cost alternatives exist. Thus, it became increasingly difficult to insulate 
corporatized utilities from corruption usually associated with state ownership of utilities, which 
has been a key motivator of reforms in the region. 
Corruption, Unbundling and Competition 
In order to target the sources of inefficiency such as corruption, reformers have advocated for 
the introduction of competitive electricity markets after the sector is unbundled vertically and 
horizontally. Thus, irrespective of ownership status, reformers anticipate that competition 
between the unbundled segments and generating plants offers a reliable mechanism to reduce 
energy losses and increase capacity utilisation. The gains are expected to increase access rates, 
while reducing the cost of service to existing consumers (Zhang et al., 2008). More importantly, 
unbundling and the subsequent competition entails consumers will have more freedom of 
choice. This also means that consumers can escape from corruption hitherto associated with 
government-owned utilities. In SSA, only Nigeria has taken steps towards wholesale 
competition after unbundling and privatising the generation and distribution segments 
(Gratwick et al., 2006).4 Although, the lack of competition in electricity markets of SSA 
countries can partly be linked to the difficulties of reforming small systems, the absence of 
private participation in countries such as Sudan,5 indicates that governance issues are still at 
the core of the electricity reform efforts in many countries. 
Despite the governance enhancing virtues of competition, experience reveals the difficulties of 
creating genuine competitive electricity markets even in developed countries which are usually 
associated with strong institutions. In SSA, the emergence of hybrid electricity markets and the 
lack of robust anti-competitive laws may explain the absence of competitive electricity markets 
                                                          
4 Nigeria established a Transitional Electricity Market (TEM) on February 1, 2015. 
5 Sudan has successfully unbundled its power sector vertically and horizontally, and has established an IRA. 
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apart from the TEM in Nigeria and the predominance of private sector largely in the form of 
IPPs. This is because competitive retail or wholesale electricity markets require sophisticated 
institutional and financial infrastructures (Eberhard et al., 2016). In order to mitigate 
investment risk in weak institutional environments, private participants such as IPPs often enter 
into power purchase agreements with the incumbent off-takers by requiring government 
guarantees, and inclusion of international arbitration clauses. 
Corruption and Private Sector Participation 
Privatisation can improve the performance of the sector through changing the incentive 
structure. The owners of privatised utilities are the residual claimants of revenue generated by 
the utility, incentivising them to close inefficiencies including those related to corruption 
(Olson, 2000). In order to attract investments many reformers advocated privatisation of state-
owned utilities to complement private sector participation. The withdrawal of the state from 
the sector would not only attract private investments and reduce the burden of subsidies on the 
government from financial overruns of state-owned utilities. Therefore, privatisation can 
reduce political interference or bureaucratic rigidities in the operations and management of 
utilities since control rights over these factors would no longer be under the direct control of 
politicians or civil servants. Despite the increase in private participation after the financial crisis 
of 2008 in SSA electricity sectors (Figure 1), there remains a funding gap for connecting the 
estimated 500 million people without access to electricity services in SSA (IEA, 2014). ADB 
(2010) notes that social welfare improvements and productivity in the region, continues to be 
constrained by the inadequate generation capacity, large technical and commercial losses, 
limited electrification, unreliable services, and high tariffs. 
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Figure 1: IPP Investments in SSA Countries, 1990-2016 
Source: World Bank PPI Database 
 
Corruption and Independent Regulatory Agencies 
Previous studies have linked large energy shortages and investment gaps to historical, financial, 
social, technical, and economic factors (e.g., Jamasb et al., 2016; Dornan, 2014; Eberhard and 
Gratwick, 2011). Recently other studies have linked the poor outcomes to the failure of IRAs 
to improve the institutional conditions of the sector as private investments largely depend on 
their credibility and independence when investing in countries with weak institutions. 
Moreover, the emergence of hybrid electricity markets which does not entail total withdrawal 
of the state from the sector (Eberhard et al., 2016),6 have made the IRAs to struggle to balance 
the interests of private utilities and the dominant state utilities. Thus, in the context of weak 
institutional environments of SSA, political expediency tied to the state-owned utilities tends 
to undermine the independence of the IRAs (Eberhard, 2007). As a result, the regulatory 
frameworks in these countries are often viewed as compromised. This leads many consumers 
to assume that the utilities are in collusion with the IRAs and make excessive profits since the 
                                                          
6 This is one of the key factors often suggested for the vulnerability of the electricity sector to corruption. 
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regulatory framework has become prone to political capture or a tool for corrupt government 
officials (Stiglitz, 1998). 
According to Eberhard et al. (2016) as of 2014, only 26 of the SSA countries have set up IRAs, 
while in the remaining countries, energy ministries or departments have the regulatory 
responsibilities and social and economic objectives. Thus, in the latter group of countries, 
governments have full regulatory discretion in determining and enforcing tariffs and service 
standards. Some argue that self-regulation allows corruption to be pervasive in the operations 
of utilities as most positions in IRAs are usually staffed with friends, family, or political and 
financial allies of politicians (Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2010). In weak institutional settings, 
the sector could be influenced by the private agendas of regulators, government, or corruption. 
Despite the links between weak institutions and performance of utilities, the issue of how 
corruption and weak governance influence the electricity sector performance post reforms has 
been neglected in the reform literature and the policies of SSA governments. In order to fill 
this gap, we analyse whether the implementations of ESR have offset or exacerbated the 
negative influence of corruption on performance. 
3.5. Hypotheses 
As noted earlier, the main objective of ESR in SSA countries was to improve technical 
efficiency and translating this into increase electricity access and keep up with economic 
growth. In order to develop a set of hypotheses to test whether these objectives have been 
achieved, we rely on the literature on corruption in regulated sectors about how a well-designed 
regulatory framework may insulate firms from corruption (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Laffont and 
Tirole, 1986; Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009). We are further guided by the development 
literature that states economic performance could be affected indirectly through the impact of 
corruption on private investment (Wei, 2000). We draw on this literature to identify three 
15 
 
indicators of electricity sector performance to assess the corruption reducing potential of ESRs. 
The variables are placed into three categories each reflecting different dimensions of 
performance – i.e., technical efficiency, electricity access and economic performance. The first 
hypothesis focuses on the technical efficiency of electricity sector proxy by Transmission and 
Distribution (T&D) losses per capita and is as follows: 
 H1: Electricity sector reforms in SSA countries, by offsetting or overcoming the adverse 
effects of corruption, have improved technical efficiency. 
 
T&D energy losses are a proxy for technical efficiency because high losses indicate that firms 
are not only undertaking the needed investments to upgrade and maintain supply networks. It 
also indicates that firms have operational challenges. Also, vandalism, illegal connections and 
bribes to workers to avoid electricity bills contribute to high losses and prevents the utilities 
from undertaking further investments. These factors adversely affect the overall sustainability 
and productivity of the sector. Therefore, we expect the reforms to enhance investor confidence 
to undertake investments, improve operations and close sources of inefficiencies leading to 
efficiency gains. We extend the assessment of impacts of ESR and corruption beyond the sector 
since one motivation of reforms in SSA was to expand the service to the unelectrified majority. 
Therefore, our second hypothesis traces the impacts of reforms to their effect on access to 
electricity. Previous research has suggested how corruption and clientelistic practices (e.g., 
Min, 2010) undermine government efforts to extend the service to the poor. Therefore, we 
expect the loosening of the ties between the government and utilities, through the creations of 
IRAs and privatisation, to reduce corruption normally related to government operations and 
regulation of utilities. Moreover, we expect technical efficiency gains from ESR to translate 
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into expansion of electricity service to those who lack access. Thus, our second hypothesis is 
as follows: 
 H2: Implementation of ESR by reducing the negative association between corruption 
and technical efficiency has increased electricity access in SSA countries. 
 
According to IEA (2014), reforms will boost the economic performance of SSA region by 30% 
in 2040, not only through private investments but also through governance improvement inside 
and outside the energy sector. Moreover, World Bank (2000) notes that ESR as part of wider 
economic liberalisation policies has the anticorruption potential to reduce the negative 
association between corruption and economic performance. Therefore, due to the positive 
association between the economy and electricity use on the one hand, and the negative 
association between corruption and economic performance, we expect the reforms to increase 
income levels. We therefore postulate that: 
 H3: Implementations ESR policies in SSA countries have enhanced economic 
performance of SSA countries by reducing negative association between corruption and 
economic growth. 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
Electricity Sector Performance Estimation 
The setup and analysis of the performance equation is influenced by the awareness that ESR in 
developing countries, as in other sectoral reforms, is not an isolated undertaking but is closely 
interlinked with the legal and institutional environments of reforming countries. Therefore, in 
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its simplest form, we postulate that electricity sector performance (Y) depends not only on the 
vector of reform policies (REF) implemented by SSA countries but also on corruption (cor) 
which measures the institutional quality of the countries, and a set of control variables (X). 
Thus, our performance output equation can be expressed as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑝𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑝𝑖𝑡
2
𝑝=1 +  𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑝
2
𝑝=1 (𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑝𝑖𝑡 · 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡) +   
   𝛽4𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽5𝑞𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑄
𝑞=1 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
where i and t index a country and year, Y is the performance output reflecting either of the three 
performance indicators: technical efficiency (T&D energy losses; losses), electricity access 
(per capita electricity consumption; access), and economic performance (GDP per capita; 
gdpper). βs are the parameters to be estimated, the term time represents a linear time-trend, 
which takes into account technological progress. αi are country-specific effects, included to 
control for time-invariant unobservables and 𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2), is the stochastic error term. The 
vector of reform policies (REF) consists of two dummies that reflect the existence of an 
independent regulatory agency (ira) and privatisation (priv), a proxy for all forms of private 
sector participation in electricity sectors. These two reform policies entail whether country i at 
time t has succeeded in establishing an independent regulatory agency and opened its doors for 
private participation. The vector of Q control variables (X) depends on which of the three 
performance indicators is used. It captures the demand side of the market and consists of GDP 
per capita (gdpper), total gross electricity generation (genper), structure (struc) and size 
(urban) of the electricity sector. 
In order to capture the corruption reducing effects of ESR on performance, we follow Estache 
et al. (2009) and Wren-Lewis (2015) and use interaction terms between corruption and the two 
reform policies (iraXcor and privXcor). The coefficients of these two interaction terms measure 
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the corruption reducing potential of reforms. We also include an interaction term between the 
two the reform policies (iraXpriv) to assess whether IRAs have constrained or improved the 
performance of privatised utilities or if private utilities have constraint or reinforced regulatory 
activity. This is important because, private investors in electricity sectors of developing 
countries mostly require credible and transparent IRAs to safeguard their investments from 
expropriation by the state. 
Similarly, as noted in the literature on regulatory capture, there is a tendency for regulatory 
capture in regulated electricity markets due to economic incentives that may push regulators to 
cater for the interest of the regulated (e.g., Olson, 1965; Dal Bó and Di Tella, 2003; Leaver, 
2009). These incentives may arise due to reliance of the regulators on the regulated entity for 
information they need to do their duties and the desire to hold future well-paid jobs with the 
regulated since human capital in the sector tends to be industry-specific. Hence, this is our 
motivation for the inclusion of the third interaction term. 
Estimation method 
In panel data regressions, the choice of an estimator mostly lies between the Random Effects 
(RE) or Fixed Effects (FE) estimators to deal with the bias of unobserved heterogeneity. 
However, both estimators address the bias at the expense of a strong exogeneity assumption. 
For instance, Equation (1) includes not only country-specific effects that can be correlated with 
other regressors, but also other theoretically established endogenous regressors (e.g., per capita 
GDP), thus the orthogonality condition is not likely to be met for a RE or FE estimator to 
produce consistent estimates. Jamasb et al. (2005) note that most ESR researchers tend to 
ignore (implicitly or explicitly) another sources of endogeneity which arises from the 
possibility of current values of ESR variables and past performance being a function of past 
condition or performance. The RE and FE estimators do not produce consistent coefficient 
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estimates in the presence of endogenous regressors and dynamics, and thus it is not possible to 
make inferences based on their estimates. 
In order to overcome the methodological concerns, we transform (1) into a dynamic panel 
specification where lagged values of the three indicators of performance, i.e., the alternative 
dependent variables (technical efficiency, electricity access and per capita GDP) are included 
as additional regressors. The dynamic performance equation can be expressed as in (2): 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝜑𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑝𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑝𝑖𝑡
2
𝑝=1 +  𝛽2𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑝
2
𝑝=1 (𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑝𝑖𝑡 · 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡) +  
       𝛽4𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽5𝑞𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑄
𝑞=1 + 𝛽6𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (2) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 denotes the lagged value of performance, whilst 𝜑 is the parameter associated with 
that variable. Other variables and coefficients are defined as before. As noted, neither the 
pooled OLS, FE nor RE estimates of 𝜑 are consistent in dynamic models when the time span 
is small (Nickell, 1981). We could consider using the dynamic panel General Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator has the 
potential to produce consistent estimates in the presence of endogeneity of regressors, 
unobserved country fixed effects and dynamics. This estimator first eliminates the country-
specific effects αi by differencing the model and instrumenting the lagged dependent variable 
(𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) with lagged levels of this variable (Arellano and Bond, 1991). However, differencing 
the data removes all time-invariant variables of interest during the estimation. Moreover, the 
Difference GMM (Diff-GMM) is noted to perform poorly in the presence of persistent 
processes since the lagged levels may convey little information on future changes, thus 
implying the problem of weak instruments and biased estimates (Roodman, 2008). 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a System GMM (Sys-
GMM) estimator to improve the efficiency of the Diff-GMM estimator. The Sys-GMM 
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estimator solves the endogeneity problem by treating the model as a system of equations in 
first difference and in levels. The endogenous regressors in the first difference equation are 
instrumented with lags of their levels, whilst the endogenous regressors in the level equation 
are instrumented with the lags of their first differences. The consistency of the Sys-GMM 
estimator depends on the assumption of no serial autocorrelation in the errors and existence of 
an array of exogenous regressors. The estimator relies on internal instruments contained within 
the panel itself and therefore eliminates the need for external instruments and it also avoids full 
specification of the serial correlation and heteroscedasticity properties of the stochastic error 
term, or any other distributional assumption. 
Despite its advantages, the Sys-GMM estimator has limitations especially as it relies on using 
the lags of both the dependent and independent variables for identification. This would 
potentially give rise to a problem of weak instruments, which is usually magnified as the 
number of instrumental variables increases. Although, increasing the instruments’ lag length 
could make them more exogenous, it may also make them weaker. Furthermore, when using 
panel data estimators such as the Sys-GMM, the bias resulting from errors in regressors may 
also be magnified (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). In order to reduce the influence of these and 
other limitations of the estimator on our results, we avoid the instruments counts exceeding the 
number of countries in the sample or overfitting of the instrumented regressors. Thus, we 
collapse the instrument set as recommended by Roodman (2009) and report the instrument 
count for each of the estimations. 
Obtaining consistent, efficient and unbiased results using the Sys-GMM estimator is contingent 
on two specification tests; Hansen test for over-identification restrictions and the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) test for serial correlation (AR) of the disturbances up to the second order. The 
Hansen test of over-identification restrictions is a joint test of model specification and 
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appropriateness of the instrument vector. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of the test would 
indicate that the instruments used in estimation are valid and the model has been well specified. 
The appropriate check of the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial correlation (AR) relates 
only to the absence of second-order serial correlation (AR2) since the first differencing induces 
first serial correlation in the transformed errors. 
Data 
Our econometric analysis is based on annual country-specific observations from 47 SSA 
countries from 2002 to 2013. The selection of countries and period are determined by data 
availability. Since the main focus of the paper is on the influence of IRAs and privatisation on 
corruption, the limited reforms implemented so far in the region would not permit us to assess 
the impacts of ESR and corruption before 2002. Similarly, the final year 2013, represents the 
last year for which data are available on electricity consumption per capita and T&D losses at 
the time we conducted the analyses. Also, we do not have complete data for all the years and 
countries. Therefore, as we analyse different performance indicators the sample size also 
changes.7 Table 1 shows all the countries included in our analysis. 
As noted, the three performance indicators (technical, welfare and economic impacts) are 
measured by T&D losses (losses) as a percentage of total electricity production, per capita 
electricity consumption (access)8 and GDP per capita (gdpper). Data on access is obtained 
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) database, while data on losses and 
gdpper are from the World Bank Development Indicator Database. Data on corruption is from 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) included in World Bank’s Governance Indicator Database, which 
includes annual country-level data. The corruption index, which measures corruption in both 
                                                          
7 The different sample sizes are reported at the bottom of the estimation results tables in the next section. 
8 See Appendix B for a discussion of this measure as a proxy for access to relative to alternative indicators. The 
variable has been averaged by total population data from World Bank Development Indicators database. 
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public and private sectors, ranges from -2.5 (highly corrupt) to 2.5 (highly clean). Data on ira 
was obtained from Eberhard et al. (2016) and updated with data from Burundi, Cape Verde, 
Madagascar, Seychelles and São Tomé and Príncipe electricity regulatory agencies’ websites.9 
Data on priv was obtained from the World Bank Infrastructure Database. Table 2 summarises 
summary statistics of the variables used. 
 
Variables Names Labels Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Electricity Gen., Per Capita genper kWh per capita 562 435 880 8 5,306 
Regulator ira Dummy 564 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Privatisation priv Dummy 564 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Corruption cor Index 564 -0.60 0.58 -1.71 1.25 
Urbanisation urban % 562 38.49 16.27 8.68 86.66 
Elect. Consumption, Per Capita access kWh per capita 562 628 1,467 7 10,566 
Household Elect. Consumption hols Million kWh 528 1,755 5,806 4 41,173 
Export export % 528 35.11 22.38 4.43 122.26* 
Industrialization ind % 522 26.24 14.30 3.33 84.28 
T&D Losses losses % 271 20.52 14.36 2.93 86.75 
GDP, Per Capita gdpper 2010 US$ 562 1,792 2,404 194 12,634 
Population Density popden Inhab./km2 562 86.63 112.45 2.38 620 
Structure struc Dummy 564 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Note: genper, access, hols, gdpper and popden were log-transformed prior to estimation 
* Equatorial Guinea is a notable exception with exports being larger than GDP 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
The data for the control variables urban and genper were obtained from the World Bank 
Development Indicators and the U.S. EIA respectively. Data for struc was obtained from World 
                                                          
9 See Burundi’s Drinking Water and Electricity Sector Control and Regulation Agency (ACR): 
https://www.ppbdi.com/index.php/extras/economie-sciences-education-formation/3397-ministere-de-l-energie-
et-des-mines-regulation-du-secteur-de-l-eau-potable-et-de-l-electricite; Cape Verde Agência de Regulação 
Económica: http://www.are.cv/index.php; Madagascar office de régulation de l'electricité: http://www.ore.mg/; 
The Seychelles Energy Commission (SEC): http://www.sec.sc/; and São Tomé and Príncipe Autoridade Geral de 
Regulação: http://www.ager-stp.org/index.php/pt/. 
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Bank Development Indicators Database and updated with data from African Development 
Bank Energy Utilities Database, included in the Africa Infrastructure Knowledge Program. 
Using these data, we follow Jamasb et al. (2004) to create an index of binary numbers 1 and 0 
to indicate whether a country has unbundled its electricity sector. urban is a proxy for the size 
of electricity markets and is measured as the percentage of total population that resides in urban 
areas. In addition, the data on total household electricity consumption (hols) was obtained from 
the United Nation’s Energy Statistics Database. 
Finally, in order to test the robustness of our results we included three additional explanatory 
variables - share of industrial output (ind), trade openness (export), and population density 
(popden) - in the performance equations in alternative estimations. 10  The data for these 
variables were obtained from World Bank Development Indicators Database. 
 
5. Results 
This section presents the results of the three performance dimensions of electricity (technical, 
welfare and economic impacts) using a dynamic panel Sys-GMM estimator. We first discuss 
the estimates of the T&D energy losses equation, then electricity consumption per capita, and 
finally the estimates of the GDP per capita equation. The results in Tables 3-5 indicate that they 
fit the data well. The AR(1) and AR(2) test statistics indicate that there is first order serial 
correlation, but not at the second order, which suggests the inconsistency of OLS and 
appropriateness of a GMM estimator in our context (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In addition, 
the Hansen test of model specification and over-identifying restrictions indicates that all three 
models are correctly specified with appropriate instruments. Our estimation strategy differs 
                                                          
10 The results of the robustness checks do not show major differences with respect to those finally presented in 
this paper. These alternative models are presented and briefly discussed in Appendix C. 
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from earlier studies that use static models to analyse the impacts of ESR on performance 
(Zhang et al., 2008; Estache et al., 2009; Wren-Lewis, 2015). 
Technical Impact – T&D Losses 
The immediate impacts of ESR are the technical improvements on the sector. The estimates of 
the Sys-GMM estimation in Table 3 shows that, the coefficient of cor is negative and highly 
significant, suggesting that an increase in the corruption index (i.e., the country is cleaner in 
terms of corruption) is associated with reduction in energy losses.11 Thus, corruption can be 
considered here as a major source of inefficiency in SSA countries. Therefore, adopting 
measures to reduce corruption can have positive impact on technical efficiency. This result is 
similar to those obtained by other studies that have found a positive relationship between 
corruption and inefficiency in the sector (Dal Bó, 2006; Estache and Trujillo, 2009; Dal Bó and 
Rossi, 2007; and Wren-Lewis, 2015). 
The coefficient of ira is significant and positive suggesting that, the creation of IRAs has led 
to a statistical increase in energy losses. A similar result was obtained by Nagayama (2010) 
who finds the establishments of IRA led to an increase in T&D losses in Latin American and 
some former Soviet Union countries. Similarly, Smith (2004) and Zhang et al. (2008) find 
reform policies such as the creations of IRAs are associated with deterioration in energy losses. 
The coefficient of priv is not significant indicating that, private sector participation has no 
impact on the technical efficiency of the sectors during the period of our study. This result 
contrasts with Clark et al. (2005) who find the introduction of private participation in countries 
such as Namibia, Nigeria, Uganda and Mali is associated with efficiency improvements. This 
                                                          
11 It should be noted that the dependent variable of this model, i.e., T&D losses, is expressed in the form of 
percentage and has not been log-transformed. This explains the large magnitude of the estimated coefficients, 
which must be interpreted as the effects, measured as changes in percentage points of the dependent variable, due 
to increases in the explanatory variables. 
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also contradicts earlier studies that find private participation in the electricity sector is 
associated with technical efficiency improvements (e.g., Andres et al., 2008; Nagayama, 2007; 
Balza et al., 2013). 
 
Technical Impact (losses) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
losses(t-1) 0.429*** 4.42 
cor -16.431** -2.19 
ira 8.626** 2.24 
priv 12.703 1.59 
struc 1.081 0.67 
iraXcor 9.749*** 4.94 
privXcor 9.342 1.18 
iraXpriv -2.105 -0.58 
ln hols -3.677*** -3.15 
urban 0.015 0.21 
time 0.228*** 2.86 
intercept 18.547*** 3.80 
No of obs. 231 
No of countries 23 
Instruments 22 
AR(1) test (p value) -2.26 (0.024) 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.71 (0.475) 
Hansen test (p value) 13.60 (0.192) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3: Two-Step GMM Estimates of T&D Losses Equation 
 
The failure of independent regulators and private sector participation in SSA countries to 
reduce the energy losses can in part be explained by the need of the reforms to initially direct 
their efforts to improve the conditions of the generation segment of the sector. This, however, 
in practice, often tends to come at the expense of delays in the regulatory reform of the 
transmission and distribution network utilities where most of the energy losses occur. Indeed, 
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economic regulation of network utilities has proven to be a rather difficult task in developed as 
well as in developing countries. 
Do electricity reforms reduce the influence of corruption on technical efficiency? This can be 
examined through the two interaction terms iraXcor and privXcor. The coefficient of iraXcor 
is positive and significant suggesting that creations of IRAs have a statistical impact on the 
relation between corruption and technical efficiency. The estimated coefficient suggests that 
IRAs has partially mitigated the influence of corruption on technical efficiency. The 
establishment of IRAs acts as a limiting factor of losses when corruption increases, but also 
limits loss reduction as countries become less corrupt. Smith (2004) argues that reform policies 
such as the creation of IRAs were not effective in reducing energy losses and especially 
electricity theft in developing countries such as in SSA. The study attributed this to weak 
quality of governance such as, ineffective accountability and political stability. 
The coefficient of the privXcor interaction term is positive but not significant suggesting that, 
the SSA countries that have opened their electricity sectors to private participation have not 
been able to offset the negative influence of corruption on efficiency. Similarly, the coefficient 
of the interaction term iraXpriv is negative but not significant indicating that regularised 
privatised networks have no effect on technical efficiency. It appears that even though IRAs 
on their own increase energy losses privatization has no effect on technical efficiency. 
Nagayama (2010) obtained a similar finding in the former Soviet Union, Eastern European and 
Latin American countries. 
Regarding the control variables, the negative and significant coefficient of hols suggests that 
an increase in household demand for electricity has led to reduced T&D losses, likely due to a 
positive size effect. The coefficients of struc and urban are not significant and suggest that 
unbundling and urbanisation have not influenced technical efficiency during the period of our 
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study. The coefficient of the time trend is positive and significant thus indicating that there has 
been an increase in the electricity losses of the countries over our sample period. It should be 
noted that this and the subsequent results should be interpreted with some caution since the 
dummies used are nominal values and thus may not capture the intensity of reform policies 
among countries in the sample. Moreover, the measure of corruption used is at best the 
perception of corruption, which could be different from reality. 
Welfare Impact – Per Capita Electricity Consumption 
The main aim of electricity sector reforms in developing countries has been to improve the 
socio-economic welfare of the population. The parameter estimates of the performance 
equation (access) are presented in Table 4. The estimated coefficient of cor is positive and 
significant, suggesting that, an increase in corruption (i.e., a decline in cor) decreases access to 
electricity services. This result is consistent with the findings by other studies on how 
corruption reduces the quality and quantity of publicly consumed services (e.g., Fredriksson et 
al., 2004; Estache et al., 2009). 
The coefficient of the IRA dummy is positive and significant, indicating that for the period 
covered by our study, countries that have created IRAs have increased access to electricity. 
This result contrasts with those obtained by Estache et al. (2009) who associated the creation 
of IRAs with reduction in electricity access. The coefficient of priv is not significant indicating 
that the privatisation policies have no significant effect on electricity access. The estimate also 
contrasts with the findings of earlier studies such as Sihag et al. (2007) and Bhattacharyya 
(2006) who find that reform steps (e.g., privatisation) have led to a decline in access rates in 
the State of Orissa in India. 
The coefficient of the interaction term iraXcor is positive and significant indicating that, 
creations of IRAs have amplified the influence of changes in corruption levels on electricity 
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access, i.e., IRAs have been effective in enhancing electricity access when corruption has 
declined. The estimate of the interaction privXcor, is not significant suggesting that private 
sector participation has not been effective in addressing the negative influence of corruption. 
It may also suggest that corruption has not constrained the efforts of privatised utilities to 
increase access to electricity. 
Regardless of the impacts of individual reform policies, the coefficient of iraXpriv suggests 
that together they exert a significant decreasing effect on access to electricity. In other words, 
although the creation of IRAs has led to increase in electricity access while privatisation has 
no effect, their interaction has led to reductions in electricity access. This may be attributed to 
the conflicting objectives of independent regulators and private utilities. Independent 
regulation may be keen to extend the often-subsidised service to mostly unelectrified poorer 
areas. However, private firms have shown little interest to extend the service to new low-
income and low-usage consumer groups. 
The coefficients of gdpper, urban and struc are all not significant suggesting that income level, 
the size, and the structure of electricity markets have no impact on electricity access.12 The 
electricity generation per capita variable (genper) is positive and highly significant indicating 
that further increases in electricity generation leads to increase in electricity access. The time 
trend is not significant indicating that there has been no improvement in the electricity access 
of the region over time. 
 
                                                          
12 The non-significant coefficient for gdpper could be related to an ambiguous relationship between per capita 
electricity consumption and income. It is expected that higher levels of per capita income imply higher per capita 
electricity consumption. However, it is also expected a negative relationship between these two variables for high 
levels of per capita GDP. This derives from the acquisition of more energy efficient appliances and the subsequent 
energy efficiency gains. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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Welfare Impact (ln access) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
ln access(t-1) 0.871*** 23.46 
cor 0.093*  1.74 
ira 0.270*** 2.86 
priv -0.051 -1.00 
struc 0.032 1.09 
iraXcor 0.157** 2.06 
privXcor -0.106 -1.60 
iraXpriv -0.209*** -2.97 
ln genper 0.092** 2.17 
ln gdpper 0.018 0.41 
urban 0.001 0.92 
time 0.001 1.13 
intercept -0.167 -0.62 
No of obs. 515 
No of countries 47 
Instruments 37 
AR(1) test (p value) -4.04 (0.000) 
AR(2) test (p value) -1.55 (0.120) 
Hansen test (p value) 31.74 (0.134) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Two-Step GMM Estimates of Per Capita Energy Consumption Equation 
 
Economic Impact – GDP Per Capita 
The earlier results indicated that the implementation of electricity reforms in SSA countries 
can reduce the negative influence of corruption on the performance of the sector. Similarly, the 
implementation of reforms in developing countries was noted to have anticorruption potentials 
to reduce the effects of corruption on economic development (World Bank, 2000). Therefore, 
we expect the electricity reforms in SSA to enhance economic performance at two levels. First, 
by enhancing the performance of the sector by improving technical efficiency and extending 
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the service to those without access. Second, as part of wider economic reforms, often 
underpinned by an anticorruption strategy, the reforms can reduce the effect of corruption on 
economic performance. 
In Table 5, where gdpper is a dependent variable in the performance equation, the coefficient 
of cor is positive and significant indicating that a decrease in corruption augments national 
income. This is consistent with other well-established findings on the relationship between 
these two variables (e.g., Barreto, 2000; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). 
Thus, an increase in the corruption control index is associated with an increase in per capita 
GDP. The coefficient of ira is not significant; suggesting that creation of IRAs has not had 
impact on the level of income. 
 
Economic Impact (ln gdpper) 
Variable Est. t-stat. 
ln gdpper(t-1) 0.565*** 7.20 
cor 0.261*** 3.38 
ira -0.050 -0.51 
priv 0.140** 2.34 
struc 0.237*** 4.32 
iraXcor -0.185 -1.63 
privXcor 0.238** 2.34 
iraXpriv 0.006 0.10 
urban 0.014*** 3.75 
time 0.001 0.73 
intercept 2.563*** 5.98 
No of obs. 515 
No of countries 47 
Instruments 41 
AR(1) test (p value) -2.57 (0.010) 
AR(2) test (p value) -1.13 (0.259) 
Hansen test (p value) 30.45 (0.443) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5: Two-step GMM Estimates of Per Capita Income Equation 
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The coefficient of priv is positive and significant indicating that private sector investments have 
boosted economic performance of SSA reforming countries. A similar result was obtained by 
Chisari et al. (1999) who find privatisation of electricity generation and distribution assets led 
to positive economic performance in Argentina. Similarly, the estimate of priv confirms the 
argument by the IMF that ESR policies such as privatisation has the potential to free up energy 
subsidies and thereby boost economic performance over the long run (IMF, 2013). 
Do the electricity reforms reduce the negative association between corruption and economic 
growth? The coefficient of iraXcor is not significant suggesting, that, for the period of this 
study, countries that established IRAs have not exerted beneficial effects on the negative 
association between corruption and per capita GDP nor has corruption affected the relation 
between regulation and economic performance. This is inconsistent with Jalilian et al. (2007) 
who stressed the importance of credible and independent regulation on economic growth. The 
coefficient of privXcor is positive and significant indicating that countries that open their 
electricity sectors to private investments have seen reinforced the influence of corruption on 
per capita GDP. Thus, countries with lower corruption levels have had further success in 
boosting income levels through private participation in the electricity sector.  
The coefficient of iraXpriv is not significant suggesting that the interaction of the regulator and 
privatisation does not exert an influence on the economic performance. One of the two control 
variables in the model, struc, is positive and significant. This suggests that unbundling 
impacted positively on per capita GDP, after controlling for the effect of corruption. The time 
trend variable is significant which indicates that per capita GDP has increased over the period 
covered by our study. 
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6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Sub-Saharan African countries are noted to have some of the highest levels of corruption in the 
world. Various studies have studied how corruption has constrained the economic development 
of these countries through different transmission channels. However, one important 
transmission channel not yet investigated is the organisation and regulation of the electricity 
sectors. Research that has analysed this channel in other developing regions has found that 
corruption can reduce technical efficiency, restrict access to electricity services to urban areas, 
and reduce income levels.  
In order to mitigate the influence of corruption in the electricity sector, reformers have called 
for the unbundling of state-owned utilities vertically (generation, transmission, distribution, 
and retailing) and horizontally (generation and retailing). The unbundled parts that are 
amenable to competition could be sold to the private sector and an independent regulatory 
agency would supervise and regulate the natural monopoly-prone networks of the sector. 
After more than two decades of electricity reforms in SSA, we can now study whether the 
reforms have reduced the influence of corruption on technical efficiency of the sector and 
whether the efficiency gains have resulted in higher electricity access and incomes. We use a 
purpose-built panel dataset and a dynamic panel estimator to investigate the effects of 
corruption on the performance of the sector. Using World Bank’s control of corruption 
perception index, we show that corruption has an adverse and statistically significant effect on 
three performance indicators – i.e. technical efficiency, access to electricity and economic 
performance. This finding adds to the body of evidence that stress the detrimental impacts of 
corruption on economic development and electricity sector performance. 
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We find that the creation of independent regulators and private sector participation, not only 
can enhance the performance of the sector but they can also have wider economic benefits. 
Specifically, we find that independent regulation can increase social welfare although it can 
also reduce technical efficiency. In addition, we show that private sector participation is 
associated with improved economic performance, while we find that privatisation policies have 
no statistically significant impact on electricity access and technical efficiency. 
We also analyse how corruption interacts with different reform steps and how these interactions 
impact on the three indicators of performance. The creation of independent regulators has 
mitigated the association between corruption and technical efficiency, while it has amplified 
the relationship between corruption and electricity access, i.e., independent regulation has been 
effective to enhance electricity access in less corrupt countries. We also find that creations of 
independent regulators have not mitigated the often-cited negative association between 
corruption and income level. Private sector participation has reinforced the influence of 
corruption on income. Thus, countries with lower corruption levels have had further success in 
boosting income levels through private participation in the electricity sector. However, private 
participation has no impact on the association between corruption and electricity access and 
technical efficiency. 
Our results suggest that implementation of well-designed micro level electricity reforms have 
the potential not only to boost the firms’ economic performance directly, they would also 
indirectly reduce the negative effects of macro-level institutional deficiencies such as 
corruption on micro and macro levels indicators of performance. For example, one of the policy 
implications from our results is the benefit of having an independent regulator that is 
transparent, fair, and accountable with the capacity for producing credible and predictable 
policies and with commitments to cost-reflective tariffs and protection of consumer interest. 
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Establishing such an institutional body would not only help reduce uncertainties surrounding 
issues related to market access, tariffs, and revenues but also help improve the overall 
governance of the sector. 
By improving sectoral governance, the regulator would reduce the need for risk mitigation 
measures such as World Bank guarantees, ring-fencing of revenues accruing to off-takers13 and 
other measures required by investors when investing in SSA countries’ power markets. Thus, 
by serving as a risk mitigator, the regulator would help attract the crucial investments needed 
to upgrade and build new transmission and distribution infrastructures and increase generation 
capacities thereby improving the overall performance of the sector. 
Another finding of our study highlights the importance of privatizing SSA countries’ state-
owned utilities and incentivising private investors through well-delineated electricity policies 
that would be easily translated into investment opportunities. Therefore, at crux of the 
electricity reform should the desire to encourage investments needed to increase efficiency by 
reducing the large T&D losses which are the main feature of sectors in SSA electricity sectors. 
Also, privatised utilities when incentivised, would reduce nontechnical or commercial losses 
by improving metering, billing, and collection of tariffs, monitoring consumption regularly, 
particularly of the high-value consumers, and by enforcement of payment discipline among 
consumers. 
Furthermore, the financial viability of the off-takers is important for attracting private 
investments since full wholesale or retail competition has not been achieved in the power 
sectors of the region.14 This is because a financially fragile off-taker that does not recover 
                                                          
13 This would boost the creditworthiness of the off-taker. 
14 Despite reforms the SSA countries’ state-owned utilities have remained the major buyers power. 
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enough revenue from consumers, would threaten the viability of whole system since it would 
be difficult for power generators to pay primary energy suppliers. 
Although, our results emphasise the importance of independent regulation and private sector 
participation, this does not suggest that other aspects of the reform model such as unbundling 
and competition are irrelevant or unimportant. For example, unbundling would have the effect 
of levelling the playing field for private generating plants, while competition would allocate 
resources efficiently and lower tariffs for consumers. Therefore, all aspects of the reform model 
are important for improving the sectoral governance, strengthening the enabling environment, 
and reduce the risk perceived by prospective investors. 
Overall, this paper shows that implementation of electricity reforms in SSA countries have, to 
some extent, addressed the root cause of inefficiency and low access and thus have moved 
utilities towards better performance through cost recovery in pricing and improved metering, 
billing, and revenue collection. By improving the performance of the sector, some aspects of 
reforms have boosted economic performance, since improvements in technical efficiency can 
be translated into higher electricity access and national income. 
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 Appendix A 
 
Country 
Year of 
financial 
closure 
Name of Project 
Subtype of 
PPI 
Project 
status 
Segment 
Chad 2000 
Societe Tchadienne d’Eau et 
d’Electricite (STEE) 
Management 
contract 
Cancelled 
G*, T** 
& D*** 
Gabon 1993 
Societe Africaine de Gestion et 
d’Investissement (SAGI) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Gambia 1993 
Management Service Gambia 
(MSG) 
Lease 
contract 
Cancelled G, T & D 
Gambia 2006 
National Water and Electricity 
Company Management 
Contract 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G 
Ghana 1994 
Electricity Corporation of 
Ghana 
Management 
contract 
Concluded D 
Guinea-
Bissau 
1991 
Electricidade e Aguas de 
Guinea-Bissau 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Kenya 2006 
Kenya Power and Lighting 
Company Management 
Contract 
Management 
contract 
Concluded T & D 
Lesotho 2002 
Lesotho Electricity 
Corporation (LEC) 
Management 
contract 
Active G, T & D 
Liberia 2010 
Liberia Electricity Corporation 
Management Contract 
Management 
contract 
Active T & D 
Madagascar 2005 Jiro syRano Malagasy (Jirama) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Malawi 2001 
Electricity Supply Corporation 
of Malawi Ltd (ESCOM) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Mali 1994 
Electricite et Eau du Mali 
(Management) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Namibia 1996 Northern Electricity 
Lease 
contract 
Concluded D 
Namibia 2000 Reho-Electricity 
Lease 
contract 
Active D 
Rwanda 2003 Electrogaz 
Management 
contract 
Cancelled G, T & D 
Rwanda 2003 Electrogaz 
Management 
contract 
Cancelled G, T & D 
São Tomé 
and Principe 
1993 
Empresa de Agua e 
Electricidade 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Tanzania 2002 
Tanzania Electricity Supply 
Company (TANESCO) 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G, T & D 
Togo 1997 
Companie Energie Electrique 
du Togo 
Management 
contract 
Concluded G & D 
*Generation, **Transmission and ***Distribution 
 
Table A1. Types of Management Contracts in SSA 
Source: World Bank PPI database 
 
 Appendix B: Electricity Consumption Per Capita as a Proxy for Access 
 
In order to assess the impacts of corruption and ESR on electricity access, we use per capita 
electricity consumption as dependent variable in Equation (1). Although this choice of 
dependent variable may have some limitations, there are several reasons why it is a better proxy 
than other two alternative measures commonly used by other scholars: IEA data on electricity 
access rates and night-time satellite imagery data captured by the US Defence Meteorological 
Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS).i 
The IEA data, which was first compiled in the “World Energy Outlook, 2002”, was based on 
various sources such as countries’ self-assessed reports (World Bank and IEA, 2015), which 
magnifies the sources of errors and thus leads to overestimation of access rates (Min, 2010). 
Another drawback of the IEA data is that, it only indicates the extent of electricity infrastructure 
provision, and therefore is silent on quality, reliability and whether services has been consumed 
or not (World Bank and IEA, 2015; Ahlborg et al., 2015).ii 
Similarly, night-time satellite imagery has some serious drawbacks. For example, the measure 
includes people without access to electricity services residing in electrified towns (Doll and 
Pachauri, 2010). As a result, its reliability as an indicator of access rate is weak since it only 
measures stable outdoor lights, which can be a major problem in SSA countries where there 
are high incidences of load shedding (World Bank, 2009).iii 
Therefore, using consumption per capita other than connection rates or satellite imagery as 
dependent variable has the advantage of assessing how consumers were able to translate access 
                                                          
i The data is archived and provided to researchers by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) at its National Geophysical Data Centre. 
ii For further discussion, see Ahlborg et al. (2015). 
iii For further shortcomings of this data, see Doll and Pachauri (2010). 
 to real use, rather than just the physical extension of electricity infrastructures. As result, if 
there are significant changes in service reliability, we expect that consumption to be adversely 
affected. Moreover, as Ahlborg et al. (2015) note, using a per capita measure rather than 
measuring average consumption among the electrified minority has the advantage of 
comparing development patterns across SSA countries of different population sizes. 
Furthermore, the per capita measure allows for the assessment of whether consumption levels 
have kept pace with population growth in each country. Thus, the proxy is a good indicator of 
whether ESR policies have improved quality, increase access to hitherto derived areas, and/or 
whether the population of those already connected have increased over time. 
 
 Appendix C: Robustness Analyses 
 
It is possible that the coefficient estimates in Tables 3, 4 and 5 may suffer from omitted-variable 
bias. Here we check the robustness of our results by adding additional explanatory variables in 
the model, one at a time to the three estimated equations to examine whether this would 
significantly affect the results. 
Cubbin and Stern (2006) argue that a rapid growing share of industrial output (e.g., in heavy 
industry such as petrochemicals, aluminium, manufacturing) is expected to increase the 
demand for electricity. Similarly, Kaldor (1970) and Cornwall (1977) argue that expansion of 
the industrial sector is a driving force for economic development. Thus, excluding this variable 
(ind) from the estimated equations could, potentially, lead to biased estimates of the effects of 
ESR and corruption on the three indicators of performance. We therefore include the share of 
industrial value added as a percentage of GDP as an additional regressor in three equations. 
Several authors also find the degree of openness of an economy to influence electricity sector 
performance (e.g., Zhang et al., 2008). We also include exports (export) as percentage of GDP 
as an additional regressor in the performance equation. The data for export is obtained from 
the World Bank governance indicators database. 
Furthermore, several studies include a variable measuring population density to assess the 
ability of both public and private utilities to extend low cost and affordable electricity to 
populations spread over vast areas (e.g., Ahlborg et al., 2015; Estache et al., 2009; Min, 2010). 
The data is from the World Bank development indicators database. 
Results of this exercise are presented in Tables C1, C2 and C3. Columns 1, 3 and 5 of each 
table presents the parameter estimates of the models when ind, export and popden are added, 
one at time, as an additional regressors to the three performance regressions. The coefficients 
 of cor, ira, priv remained significant/not significant depending on the performance indicator 
with the expected signs regardless of the additional regressors added to the three equations. 
The only exception is priv in two of the energy losses equations, which shows a significant and 
positive coefficient while this was found not significant in Table 3. Similarly, the coefficients 
of the two interactions of interest, iraXcor and privXcor, remain significant/not significant in 
most cases (except the coefficient iraXcor in the per capita GDP equations and privXcor in one 
of the energy losses equations and one of the per capita GDP equations) regardless of extra 
additions to the three regressions. 
Therefore, we consider that the additional inclusions do not significantly alter the estimates of 
the coefficients for cor, ira and priv. Moreover, the estimates relative to the two interaction 
terms (iraXcor and privXcor) remain relatively stable regardless of which of the additional 
variables is introduced in the performance equations. These results seem to indicate that the 
estimates presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5 are not suffering from omitted-variable bias. 
 
 Technical Impact (losses) 
  ind ind + export ind + export + popden 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
losses(t-1) 0.646*** 3.93 0.477** 2.11 0.421*** 2.82 
cor -30.031*** -4.38 -37.408** -2.00 -35.648** -1.97 
ira 20.383*** 3.07 50.552** 2.34 39.746** 2.57 
priv 11.361 1.17 41.181* 1.70 49.538** 2.29 
iraXcor 15.939* 1.94 28.549** 2.23 24.909*** 2.69 
privXcor 14.790 1.43 8.439 0.55 32.972** 2.32 
iraXpriv 4.042 0.44 -26.730** -1.98 -29.135** -2.27 
ln hols -5.170*** -2.62 -2.241 -0.80 -6.426** -2.05 
struc 1.052 0.34 -2.082 -0.57 1.913 0.57 
urban 0.304 1.11 0.587* 1.86 -0.030 -0.12 
ind -0.438 -1.02 0.236 0.90 0.498 1.54 
export   -0.273** -2.04 -0.582* -1.73 
ln popden     8.424*** 3.26 
time -0.233 -0.94 -0.209 -0.58 0.603** 2.02 
intercept 15.236 1.16 -50.491 -1.51 -18.420 -1.53 
No of obs. 217 206 206 
No of countries 22 22 22 
Instruments  20 20 22 
AR(1) test (p value) -2.33 (0.020) -1.68 (0.093) -1.99 (0.046) 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.73 (0.465) 0.21 (0.831) -0.61 (0.544) 
Hansen test (p value) 6.46 (0.487) 7.61 (0.268) 2.77 (0.906) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table C1: Two-Step GMM Estimates of T&D Losses Equation 
 
 Welfare Impact (ln access) 
  ind ind + export ind + export + popden 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
ln access(t-1) 0.916*** 151.42 0.920*** 121.58 0.915*** 87.88 
cor 0.093*** 3.19 0.049** 2.22 0.068* 1.80 
ira 0.084** 2.42 0.130*** 5.60 0.127*** 3.81 
priv -0.003 -0.08 0.036 1.47 -0.012 -0.35 
iraXcor 0.044* 1.93 0.020* 1.89 0.077*** 3.90 
privXcor -0.009 -0.23 0.038 1.25 -0.020 -0.49 
iraXpriv -0.081* -1.72 -0.116*** -5.24 -0.091*** -3.01 
ln genper 0.046*** 5.59 0.031*** 3.47 0.048*** 4.43 
ln gdpper 0.005 0.49 0.011* 1.69 -0.006 -0.38 
struc 0.048*** 3.70 0.047*** 6.05 0.046*** 4.72 
urban 0.001*** 3.65 0.001** 2.10 0.001 -0.55 
ind 0.002*** 3.90 0.001 1.29 0.002*** 2.70 
export   0.002*** 5.61 0.001*** 2.73 
ln popden     -0.003 -0.70 
time 0.002*** 2.85 0.001* 1.71 0.003*** 2.61 
intercept -0.141*** -2.59 -0.246*** -4.88 -0.069 -0.75 
No of obs. 480 454 452 
No of countries 45 44 44 
Instruments  43 44 44 
AR(1) test (p value) -4.13 (0.000) -4.10 (0.000) -4.12 (0.000) 
AR(2) test (p value) -1.53 (0.125) -1.59 (0.111) -1.35 (0.178) 
Hansen test (p value) 26.55 (0.596) 28.10 (0.512) 22.12 (0.776) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table C2: Two-Step GMM Estimates of Per Capita Energy Consumption Equation 
 
 Economic impact (ln gdpper) 
  ind ind + export ind + export + popden 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. Est. t-stat. 
ln gdpper(t-1) 0.466*** 8.73 0.716*** 14.41 0.824*** 25.51 
cor 0.199** 2.44 0.185*** 3.51 0.085* 1.78 
ira 0.050 0.55 -0.056 -1.21 -0.014 -0.22 
priv 0.272*** 3.38 0.080* 1.79 0.214*** 3.69 
iraXcor -0.248*** -3.37 -0.116*** -6.66 -0.264*** -4.90 
privXcor 0.239** 2.04 -0.016 -0.32 0.266*** 4.27 
iraXpriv -0.116* -1.72 -0.062 -1.27 -0.121** -2.58 
struc 0.163*** 3.51 0.103*** 5.37 0.098*** 3.25 
urban 0.016*** 5.91 0.007*** 3.29 0.005*** 3.88 
ind 0.007*** 5.93 0.002*** 4.38 0.002** 2.46 
export   0.004*** 4.83 0.002*** 2.98 
ln popden     -0.005 -0.39 
time 0.001 -0.08 0.001 0.41 -0.001 -1.43 
intercept 2.810*** 10.76 1.587*** 6.19 0.947*** 4.96 
No of obs. 480 454 452 
No of countries 45 44 44 
Instruments  42 43 39 
AR(1) test (p value) -2.29 (0.022) -3.17 (0.002) -3.01 (0.003) 
AR(2) test (p value) -0.66 (0.510) -1.21 (0.226) -1.13 (0.257) 
Hansen test (p value) 26.38 (0.655) 20.35 (0.907) 21.06 (0.689) 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table C3. Two-Step GMM Estimates of Per Capita Income Equation 
